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Abstract 
Myanmar is languishing at the bottom of key international indexes. United Nations considers the 
country as a structurally weak and vulnerable economy. Yet, from 2011 when Myanmar ended 
decades of military rule and isolationism and transited towards democracy, its breakneck 
development has led to many considering the country to be one of the final frontiers for growth in 
the Asia region. One such industry that has benefitted from the opening of the country is 
telecommunications. The mobile penetration rate at 4.8% in 2011 has increased significantly to 
90% in 2016. 
Despite renewed optimism and development in the economy, one statistic remains disappointing. 
According to a report by Asian Development Bank (ADB), only 23% of the adult population have 
access to a bank account. This highlights a need to reach out and increase access to financial 
resources to a population that is severely unbanked and underbanked. 
This creates an interesting proposition of allowing both the telecommunications and financial 
sector to form the mobile financial services (MFS) sector and meet the need of improving access 
to financial resources for the population. This report explores the government role in supporting, 
growing and sustaining the MFS sector and conducts a comparative research into Singapore, 
Malaysia and Thailand to understand the steps taken by these governments to develop their own 
Financial Technology (FinTech), specifically MFS, industry. Finally, the report will present 
preliminary recommendations that the Myanmar government could consider implementing to 
drive growth in its MFS sector. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Republic of the Union of Myanmar has seen unprecedented progress over the past decade and 
is widely considered to be one of the final frontiers for growth in the Asian region (Tan, Neo, & 
Oeni, 2012). Since 2011, Myanmar has undergone a series of political, economic and social 
changes, started during Thein Sein’s leadership and now under National League of Democracy 
(NLD) (Deloitte, 2013). 
 
One such change is the passing of the Telecommunications Law in 2013, which saw the ownership 
of SIM cards and internet connectivity shifting from elite’s enclave to the lowest-income 
households in Myanmar (Kean, 2017). The prices of SIM cards fell from US$150-200 in 2010 to 
US$2 in 2013-2014 (Nam, Cham, & Halili, 2015), which served to drive up mobile penetration 
rate. Data from GSMA website places Myanmar’s mobile penetration rate at 89.84% and mobile 
broadband penetration rate at 49.55% as at 2016 (GSMA, 2016). However, a point to note is that 
the data are calculated using mobile subscription numbers and not unique individuals. Hence, due 
to the possibility of an individual owning more than 1 mobile subscription, the actual figures may 
be lower than what was reported on GSMA’s connectivity index. Despite these positive statistics, 
it does not present the lopsided contention between the urban and rural populations. 70% of the 
population live in rural areas, but the telecommunications infrastructure is biased towards the 
major cities. This results in poor coverage outside of urban areas, limiting usage accordingly 
(Deloitte, 2013). 
 
The focus on the rapid growth rate of mobile penetration and broadband is intentional. It highlights 
the leapfrog nature of Myanmar’s society. Majority of the population did not own a mobile phone 
in 2012 (Deloitte, 2013), yet over the course of 4 years, mobile phone penetration rate not only 
increased significantly, but smartphones account for more than half of the mobile phones used in 
Myanmar. This also means that most of the population leapfrogged the usual course of phone 
ownership and went directly into owning a smartphone from not owning a phone preciously. 
 
Contrasting this, the financial sector in Myanmar remains underdeveloped. The adoption rate of 
financial services by the population remains low and access to financial services remains 
challenging. A report published by Asian Development Bank (ADB), in collaboration with Oliver 
Wyman reported that over a 12-month period, only 23% of Myanmar’s adult population have 
access to a bank account and only 13% save money with a formal financial institution (FI). With 
the limitation of poor data, ADB estimates that less than 10% of Myanmar’s total needs in 
payments and money transfers are handled by formal FIs, which further supports the challenges 
shrouding the country’s financial sector (Asian Development Bank; Oliver Wyman, 2017). 
However, Myanmar’s financial sector has the potential to succeed. While local banks have been 
struggling since the liberalisation of the financial sector in 2011, experiencing a decrease of 14% 
in total banking assets from June 2015 to June 2016, private banks have reported an increase of 
27% in total banking assets over the same period (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2017). Private banks 
are also experiencing extraordinary growth over the past 6 years, with private banks growing more 
than 10 times, with total assets growing from approximately US 1.6 billion in March 2010 to USD 
17.3 billion in March 2016 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2017). 
 
Against the backdrop of robust growth in mobile penetration and limp adoption rate of financial 
services, it is important to focus on the population demographics of Myanmar. Myanmar has a 
very young population, with 70% under the age of 40. Moreover, the largest group fall into the 
“Digital Native” category (Prensky, 2001). This category has been arbitrarily used to described 
anyone born after 1980, the digital age. Digital natives are comfortable with technology and 
consider it to be an integral and necessary part of their lives (Prensky, 2001).  
 
In Myanmar, there are two sectors that are positioned for growth soon: Telecommunications and 
Finance. This also points towards the exciting prospect of a sector that sees the amalgamation of 
the above-mentioned sectors: mobile banking services. With smartphone penetration and 
connectivity is increasing rapidly, and a large number of “digital natives” in its population, more 
opportunities exist in the economy for mobile-based businesses. This drives a focus towards the 
purpose of this paper, which is the exploration of the potential of a thriving mobile banking 
industry, and more importantly, how the Burmese government should consider the industry and 
induct initiatives and or legislation to support the emergence, growth and sustainability of mobile 
banking in Myanmar. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The state of FinTech in ASEAN has gained much attention over the past 8 years (United Overseas 
Bank, 2017). Hence, recent literatures surrounding the industry with a focus on ASEAN have been 
relatively easy to find. These literatures are also contributed by large organisations, ranging from 
international financial institutional banks to international organisations such as the United Nations 
(UN). In addition, I have also referenced to literatures that researched extensively the issue of 
financial inclusion efforts, with a focus on Myanmar. This is in line with the objective of this 
project, that the recommendations put forth will seek to support, grow and sustain a mobile 
financial services environment that will increase access to financial services, especially for the 
unbanked and underbanked. 
 
A report jointly produced by United Overseas Bank (UOB), Ernst and Young (EY), Singapore 
FinTech Association (SFA) and ASEAN FinTech Network (AFN) in 2017 focused on the 
criticality of developing FinTech within ASEAN. This report sets the context of the rise of FinTech 
on a global scale, seen from Figure 1. The FinTech investment activity grew exponentially from 
2014 to 2016, rising from US$2.3 billion in 2014 to US$14.4 billion in 2016, representing a 526% 
increase. 
 
 
Figure 1: Global FinTech Investment Activity 
ASEAN too, witnessed growth in FinTech. This growth is represented both in value of funding 
received for FinTech products/services/solutions and the volume of funding. Investments in 
Southeast Asian FinTech market rose 33% from 2015 to 2016 and volume of investment activity 
during the same period rose nearly 20% (United Overseas Bank, 2017) 
 
The report points out too, that as at 2014, half of the adult population in ASEAN, approximately 
264 million adults, are unbanked. The statistic widens in rural areas, with 74% of the rural 
population being unbanked. So, ipso facto, most FinTech initiatives are on payments and mobile 
wallets to drive greater financial inclusion. Payment and mobile wallet solutions account for 43% 
of ASEAN’s FinTech activities, with financial comparison solutions coming in second at 15%. 
(United Overseas Bank, 2017). The urgency for FinTech to play a larger role in promoting 
financial inclusion is even more evident with the low bank penetration in majority of ASEAN 
countries, as seen in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Adults with an account in 2014 
Yet these statistics makes it even more attractive and vital for FinTech companies to develop and 
offer solutions. As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, the adoption of digital mediums is 
at an all-time high for Myanmar, and this is crucial for the field of FinTech. Myanmar has seen 
high smartphone penetration rate, and this becomes an indicator of the population’s readiness in 
adopting FinTech, more so with mobile-based financial services. 
 
An extensive research paper was commissioned by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation that 
looked specifically into the opportunities and potential of mobile-based financial services in 
Myanmar. The research for this paper was conducted with a country-level diagnostic, leveraging 
data from the Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM), Ministry of Communications, 3 
telecommunications companies operating in Myanmar, Facebook, Viber, United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA) and a representative Information and Communication Technology 
survey of 7,500 households. The paper holds that Myanmar provides an ideal lab environment to 
develop an entire ecosystem of mobile-based financial services that could not only disrupt the 
cycle of poverty but also become an integral part of everyday lives. This literature also touched 
briefly on the impacts of governmental policies and collaboration with other governments and 
organisations. It pointed out the importance of influencing and shaping the mobile financial 
services industry, to accelerate the implementation, adoption and impact across the ecosystem. 
Crucially, all these need to be done to push the industry to reach all parts of Myanmar, even the 
poorest and most vulnerable of areas (Htun & Bock, 2017).  
 
Tracing the existing literatures, ASEAN is poised for exponential growth in FinTech. This is 
unsurprising considering the rise of FinTech globally. Extrapolating the rate of growth within 
ASEAN, it would point towards Myanmar partaking in this growth. The report commissioned by 
Bill and Belinda Gates Foundation investigated the potential of mobile-based financial services, 
of which this will be the focal point of interest in this paper. Yet, all existing literatures hardly 
explores the relationship between regulation and encouraging FinTech activity. Moreover, there is 
a wealth of knowledge that has been accumulated by the experiences of other jurisdictions’ efforts 
to incubate, grow and sustain FinTech activities, while at the same time, ensuring that there are 
appropriate regulations and or safeguards that protects not only the consumers but the larger 
financial ecosystem as well. As such, the methodology taken in this report will be a comparative 
analysis of 3 ASEAN countries, namely Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. This is done to 
understand what these macrosocial units have done specifically to encourage FinTech activity and 
the steps they have taken to ensure that the industry grows sustainably and in a manner that does 
not impose unreasonable risk on the entire economy. Finally, these findings will lead to 
preliminary recommendations for Myanmar – understanding best practices around the region, 
learning from their neighbours’ experiences and localizing the findings for potential 
implementation by the government. 
3.0  Methodology 
 
It has been highlighted in the earlier paragraphs that both the telecommunications sector and 
financial services sector are poised for growth, and this will also lead to an exciting prospect for a 
mobile financial services sector to emerge from the amalgamation of both sectors. Yet, the risk of 
not regulating this new sector may undermine the benefits, especially long-term, that mobile 
financial services might bring to the economy. Additionally, it is important not to over-regulate 
the sector as well, to prevent stifling growth in the sector through the setting of too many rules and 
over-bureaucracy.   
 
This paper provides a comparative analysis of governmental frameworks and policies across 3 
countries, namely Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. According to Figure 3 below, these are 
selected to their popularity in ASEAN for FinTech companies which serves as evidences for good 
infrastructure, supportive policies/ regulations, mobile penetration, capable workforce (United 
Overseas Bank, 2017) and the relatively closer cultural similarities. The main objective for doing 
so is explained in the above section - to develop a unique framework to govern the mobile banking 
sector for Myanmar.  
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of FinTech companies among ASEAN 
Comparison is inherent in all echelons of a society, and a research methodology based off this is 
fundamental. Generally, carrying out a comparative analysis would lead to an identification 
process of the similarities and differences between macrosocial units - countries, nations and other 
larger political entities. The importance of drawing such information lies in understanding and 
interpreting these processes and the significance of such knowledge (Ragin, 1987). 
 
Using a comparative method in the discipline of political science has a standardized definition 
referring to the systematic analysis of a small number of cases, otherwise known as a “small N” 
(Collier, 1993). There have been many literatures detailing the comparative method, and these 
formed a basic understanding of the practice of “small N” studies. One of the most important and 
outstanding literature is from Arend Lijphart’s 1971 article titles “Comparative Politics and 
Comparative Method.” His work found that data collection using the comparative method 
demanded less resources as compared to experimental or statistical methods. Hence, it is most 
appropriate in researches that face scarcity of time, energy and financial resources because an 
intensive comparative analysis with a lack of resources may prove to be more promising than a 
more superficial analysis of many cases. And in such a situation, it will be fruitful to consider the 
comparative analysis method as the first step of research, setting the stage for future statistical 
analysis to be carried out on the back of this research (Lijphart, 1971). 
 
Yet, there are some opponents towards this methodology - citing resultant biases when 
comparisons are made across political and social systems that are territorial (Pennings et al, 1999) 
and also the advantages and disadvantages of selecting countries as ‘comparators’, with one such 
disadvantage being the obscurity of domestic differences of a particular country when being 
compared to international differences and or standards (Arnove, Kelly, & Altbach, 1982). 
 
We will be applying the comparative analysis across territorially distinct macrosocial units as 
explained in my previous paragraphs and will also adopt the viewpoint that the countries selected 
are distinct enough to provide valuable knowledge. In addition, we will also attempt to localize 
the information into relevant material for the context of Myanmar. 
 
The justification for using comparative analysis as the governing methodology for this paper are:  
 To identify similarities and differences arising from the practices, processes and policies 
from the various jurisdictions 
 To understand the conditions of which the frameworks and policies had been created from 
 To study the impact of governmental support through policies on the FinTech industry, 
with a focus on mobile financial services 
 The scarcity of time, energy and financial resources 
 
In this paper, we propose a theoretical roadmap for the Myanmar government in building a 
conducive environment for mobile financial services as an industry to thrive. This proposed 
roadmap is done predominantly by comparing and analysing other countries’ governmental 
initiatives and policies towards this industry. The countries selected based on their efforts and 
success in encouraging growth in the FinTech industry are, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. 
These countries are part of ASEAN and selected based on the progress made by these governments 
and the proximity and closer cultural similarities to Myanmar. 
 
4.0  Preliminary Findings 
4.1  Singapore’s FinTech Space 
4.1.1 Smart Nation Drive 
Singapore has enjoyed success in its push towards transforming into a smart nation. Since 
Singapore’s Prime Minister, Mr Lee Hsien Loong, introduced this focus (Lee, 2014), the Smart 
Nation Programme Office has been set up to coordinate efforts and initiatives across all 
Government departments to fulfil the mission of building a Smart Nation that effectively benefits 
everyone. Since then till now, Singapore has climbed the ranks to be one of the forerunners of 
smart cities globally1. 
Singapore laid out 3 key pillars in its pursuit of its Smart Nation goals. They are Digital Economy 
Framework for Action, Digital Government Blueprint and Digital Readiness Blueprint. The Digital 
Economy Framework for Action is focused on encouraging Singapore to thrive in the digital 
economy. This framework spells out the Government’s strategy to guide collective efforts in 
keeping Singapore ahead of the ever-changing digital economy landscape. This includes 
infrastructure spending, other investments to increase Singapore technological capacity and 
capabilities, to name a few. The other 2 pillars, which are not as relevant, shows the Government’s 
efforts to transform public service by leveraging data and using new technologies and to increase 
digital literacy among its citizenry, ensuring that the population are using technology responsibly 
and serves to benefit themselves and the society, respectively.  
In addition, to drive adoption of technologies, Key Strategic National Projects have been identified 
as key enablers in Singapore’s Smart Nation drive. Out of these, there is a focus on e-Payments 
which aims to allow everyone to make payments in a simple, swift, seamless, and safe manner. 
For the purposes of this report, the focus will be on the Digital Economy Framework for Action 
and e-Payments. 
4.1.2  Digital Economy Framework for Action 
The Singapore Government intends to equip businesses, workers and the populace to harness the 
potential and advantages of the digital economy. This is done through 3 pillars, Accelerate, 
Compete and Transform. These pillars will be supported by 4 enablers, Talent; Research and 
Innovation; Policy, Regulations and Standards; Physical and Digital Infrastructure. 
Accelerate: To increase the pace of digitalisation of existing industries for productivity 
improvements, efficiency gains and new revenue opportunities. 
Compete: To increase economic competitiveness by fostering new integrated ecosystems centred 
around customers’ needs 
Transform: To develop the next-gen digital industry as growth engine for the economy and drive 
digitalisation across industries 
With a keen eye on the usage of mobile technologies to effect change on the wider digital economy, 
Singapore has invested heavily in its physical and digital infrastructure on which future digitalised 
                                                          
1 https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/singapore-tops-global-smart-city-performance-
ranking-in-2017-study, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/singapore-best-performing-smart-
city-globally-study-10038722, https://www.straitstimes.com/business/spore-pips-london-ny-to-top-global-smart-
city-ranking  
products and services have a strong foundation to be developed upon, and users have the necessary 
infrastructure to adopt mobile technologies. Singapore comes in first in terms of 4G speed by 
OpenSignal and sees a wireless broadband penetration rate of 200% and a mobile phone 
penetration rate of 150%2.  
In addition to infrastructure spending that empowers innovation, the report outlined a S$225 
million fund that has been created to support FinTech efforts that will contribute to Singapore’s 
push to become a digital financial centre. As such, Singapore currently ranks 1st in the 2018 
Institute for Financial Services Zug (IFZ) Global FinTech Rankings.  
4.1.3 E-payments 
The Singapore Government has made clear its focus on developing the E-payments space. The 
view that e-payments can  
1) make transactions simple, swift, and safe for both consumers and businesses  
2) boost digitisation of business processes, enhance productivity, reduce costs and create new 
business models in the digital economy 
provides justification to invest into E-payments (Smart Nation and Digital Goverment Office; 
Monetary Authority of Singapore; The Association of Banks in Singapore, 2017). To run this, the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has been tasked spearhead this and to determine the right 
approach and or regulations towards this area. MAS functions as Singapore’s central bank. Its role 
includes formulating monetary policy and identifying emerging trends and potential vulnerabilities 
within the financial industry. It also operates on a mandate which seeks to foster a sound and 
progressive financial services sector in Singapore. This is achieved by enabling a close working 
relationship between government agencies and FIs.  
The last point on the importance of public-private cooperation is evident. The Institute for 
Infocomm Research, a government agency, serves as a platform to connect FIs with scientists who 
are seeking to commercialise their research. 
Moving from this, with the nation’s focus on building a Smart Nation with transforming the digital 
economy as a pillar and e-Payments as a Key Strategic National Project, the focus now shifts 
towards MAS and their role in regulating this space, specifically the focus of this paper – FinTech. 
The next 2 sections will look into MAS initiatives, namely the regulatory sandbox and the Payment 
Services Bill. 
4.1.4  Regulatory Sandbox 
MAS approach towards the burgeoning FinTech industry is not to create regulations. On the 
contrary, MAS undertook a “regulatory sandbox” approach. This approach allows banks to 
experiment their FinTech solutions without the need to obtain regulatory approval in advance 
(Vasagar & Weinland, 2016). 
In June 2016, MAS created FinTech Regulatory Sandbox Guidelines which sets up to encourage 
more FinTech experimentation so that innovations can be tested in the market and have a chance 
for wider adoption. These experimentations will be carried out within a well-defined scope which 
includes duration and space, and the sandbox will include safeguards to contain any repercussions 
or consequences of failures so that the overall financial system continues to be safe. MAS also 
                                                          
2 https://www.imda.gov.sg/industry-development/facts-and-figures/telecommunications#1x  
maintains the right over the legal and regulatory requirements which will either be tightened, 
maintained or relaxed for every experiment. The sandbox model aims to seek a “sweet-spot” in 
the trade-off between regulation and innovation, by subjecting FinTech entities to regulations upon 
proving that the solution put forward has 1) achieved its intended outcomes in test scenarios and 
2) that it will be able to satisfy and be compliant to the relevant legal and regulatory requirements. 
The steps needed by a company to enter the regulatory sandbox is relatively straightforward, as 
seen in Figure 4: 
 
Figure 4 Process of applying and participating in the Regulatory Sandbox 
 
While Figure 4 is simplified to explain the process for an entity to apply and go through the 
regulatory sandbox, there are criteria that entities must adhere to. MAS developed 2 sections in its 
guidelines that serves as an eligibility check for entities. Only when an entity is confident that its 
products/services meet the objective, principles and criteria set out in these sections, then they are 
to send in their application. Although MAS casts a wide net to encourage applicants to participate 
in the sandbox, the sections developed act as an invisible barrier for entities looking to apply. 
This invisible barrier provides some order in sifting out applications from the onset. There are 
regulations that are to be maintained, such as adherence to the Personal Data Protection Act 
(PDPA), Anti-Money Laundering (AML)/ Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) 
regulations. MAS is lax on the wording of the application requirements, which is summed up in 
paragraph 2.3 of the FinTech Regulatory Sandbox Guidelines as “Depending on the financial 
service to be experimented, the applicant involved, and the application made, MAS will determine 
the specific legal and regulatory requirements which it is prepared to relax for each case.” MAS 
provides examples of these legal and regulatory requirements in Annex A of the guidelines, and 
while examples, the requirements that are to be maintained involves PDPA and AML/CFT.  
However, FIs are already free to launch new financial products, services or processes without first 
seeking MAS’ permission (MAS, 2016), and with this, it is probable that new FinTech may be 
introduced through it. This begs many questions over the effectiveness of the sandbox model, and 
who are the target audience for the sandbox. 
Apply
•Evaluation
•Wait for approval 
Sandbox
•Boundaries set
•Testing begins
•Progress report
Exit
•Broader Deployment
•Sandbox failed
Overall, the intent is good - to encourage innovation and provide a safe environment to test 
promising innovations. 
4.1.5 Payment Services Bill 
 
Payment services in Singapore have been regulated under 2 separate legislations, namely the 
Payment Systems (Oversight) Act (Cap. 222A) and the Money-Changing and Remittance 
Businesses Act (Cap. 187). However, MAS recognises that the landscape for payment services has 
changed significantly over the years and is proposing to:  
1) streamline the 2 legislations above   
2) enhance the scope of regulated activities 
3) adopt a modular regulatory approach to calibrate regulations according the risks posed 
by the relevant activities 
These considerations give rise to the proposed Payment Services (PS) bill, with a key intent to 
promote greater confidence among consumers and merchants to adopt e-payments. This is in line 
with the nation’s push into e-payments as a focus area. 
A report issued by PwC titled “Strengthening Singapore’s payment services through regulation” 
provides a succinct overview of the proposed PS bill and the intended impact it brings. This bill 
signals MAS’ departure from product-based licensing model into an activities-based and risk-
based licensing model. This is significant. Having a “blanket” license with the previous approach 
fails to consider new payment services model, bringing about risks in the economy. Hence, having 
a modular activities-based and risk-based licensing model would allow MAS to expand the scope 
of regulated activities and implement risk-mitigating measures towards licensees’ activities, 
wherever relevant. In this modular approach, payment institutions will see their activities subjected 
to approval, but the activities are not licensed individually (PwC, 2018). So, all retail payment 
services providers will be classified under one of the following categories: 
 Major Payment Institutions (this includes operators of existing widely accepted stored-
value facilities) 
 Standard Payment Institutions 
 Money-Changers – which can only provide money-changing services 
In my view, I think this is necessary and good for payment services providers as it reduces the 
regulatory and bureaucratic burden to comply. 
On the risk-based licensing model, the PS bill outlines 4 key risks that are applicable to payment 
services providers 
 Money laundering/ terrorism financing (ML/TF) 
Using online payment methods as a medium for ML/TF 
 User protection 
Transaction disputes and insolvency of e-money issuers are adequately addressed 
 Interoperability 
There must be 3rd-party access to payment systems on fair and reasonable commercial 
terms. It is also mandatory to participate in a common platform and or an interoperable 
common standard for payments, such as a standardised QR code. 
 Technology risk 
Ensure cybersecurity through user authentication, prevention of data loss and fraud 
monitoring and or protection 
The ML/TF requirement will apply to all the 3 licenses listed above, whereas the remaining 
requirements will apply to payment institutions only.  
In the PS bill, there are proposed exclusions in 2 categories: 
1) Carving out of 3 specific activities, namely limited purpose e-money and virtual currency, 
and incidental or necessary payment activities. These include loyalty programmes or public 
authority pre-paid cards. Limited purpose virtual currencies refer to in-game credits and 
are to be distinguished from Bitcoin and Ether. 
2) Specific application of risk-mitigation measure. ML/TF mitigations will not apply to 
certain low risk services such as money transfer services used for payment for goods or 
services from an identifiable source. However, MAS is seeking feedback on whether 
payment for goods on e-commerce platforms should be classified as low risk. 
In this report, PwC is of the view that the proposed changes in the PS bill will become a catalyst 
for the development of Singapore’s payments industry and landscape, enhancing its competitive 
edge. However, MAS must be thoughtful and sensitive in the implementation of this bill. The bill 
addresses some questions regarding the transitional period during implementation. Entities that are 
considered low risk would qualify for specific exemptions. A 6-month grace period will be 
extended to in-scope entities that are currently not subject to regulatory requirements. This grace 
period will allow entities time to be compliant to regulations. Due to the fragmented nature of 
payment services, there will be a deferred start for interoperability requirements, again allowing 
time to providers to introduce such measures into their payment services. Lastly, there will be 
transitional provisions for regulated FIs and payment firms (PwC, 2018). While the proposed bill 
is short of details, these arrangements to ease the transition from PS(O)A and MCRBA should be 
received positively by providers. 
 
4.2 Malaysia’s FinTech Space 
 
In Bank Negara Malaysia’s (BNM) 10-year financial blueprint issued in 2011, it identified the 
strategic importance of using e-payments as one of the 9 focus areas to achieve the main goal of 
transforming Malaysia into a and high-income and value-added economy. BNM has recognised 
the need to collaborate with all payment system stakeholders to improve the entire payment 
process and change payment behaviour. Hence, the Bank has committed to provide fair and healthy 
competition in the retail payments space. However, the Bank acknowledges that achieving 
economies of scale is of equal importance to generate cost efficiency. In its blueprint, BNM believe 
economies of scale and cost efficiency can be achieved when there is one or a small number of 
players that exist in the sector (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2011). This brings about the need to achieve 
a fine balance between fair competition and having one major or a small number of players in the 
sector. BNM have decided that having close oversight and regulatory prescriptions to prevent anti-
competitive behaviour would allow this fine balance to be achieved.  
BNM laid out markers to work towards and has committed to accelerate migration into e-
payments. These markers can be seen in the table below. 
 2018 figures Target by 2020 
E-payment transactions per capita 111 200 
Debit card transactions per capita 5.1 (2017 
figures) 
30 
No. of electronic funds transfer at point of sale (EFTPOS) 
terminal per 1,000 inhabitants 
14 25 
Number of cheques cleared 119 million 100 million 
Table 1: Extracted from Bank Negara Malaysia 
BNM’s focus on e-payments come with the viewpoint that e-payments would allow businesses 
and the larger society to enjoy convenience and operational efficiency that would come from the 
expedited nature in payments and receiving funds. A speech by the Governor of BNM, Muhammad 
bin Ibrahim in 2018 seems to present that Malaysia is on track to meeting the markers listed above 
and societal changes that fit into the macro-level benefits. For ease of reading, I have input the 
2018 markers into Table 1. As seen, it seems unlikely that BNM would achieve its targets. This 
was evident in the same speech, where the Governor alluded that cash-based transactions remains 
prevalent among retail transactions in the country, especially with lower tier merchants, who prefer 
dealing with cash. 
Unlike Singapore, Malaysia does not have a macro policy objective of digital transformation. 
Instead, BNM has identified e-Payments to be an area of strategic importance and has devoted 
resources to encourage consumers to utilise this mode of payment. Hence, the next section will 
investigate BNM’s efforts in the e-Payments space before analysing the regulations and safeguards 
proposed by BNM, namely the regulatory sandbox. 
4.2.1 Mobile payments and e-wallet systems 
In another speech by the Governor of BNM in 2017, he provided more specifics on how the 
medium of mobile phones should be optimised for payments. This is more relevant to the aim of 
this report. BNM opines that mobile payments can become a viable, low-cost alternative to using 
cash and complement card payments. To push the envelope further, e-wallet systems are viable as 
merchants can accept payment through a QR code. It will be cheaper for consumers to use QR 
code as opposed to paying the Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) that is levied on card payments. 
The usage of QR code is significant because it enables financial inclusion. In Malaysia, there are 
24 million adults and of this, 10 million are not using online services and 2 million are unbanked. 
Having non-bank e-payment providers would serve this segments, and QR code can become the 
catalyst for this service. To this end, BNM has introduced an Interoperable Credit Transfer 
Framework (ICTF) to achieve 2 objectives, namely avoid market fragmentation and broaden 
financial inclusion. The ICTF will link both banks and non-bank e-money providers to ensure that 
consumers are able to reach their bank accounts and or e-money accounts. This way, it will allow 
all consumers to transfer funds seamlessly by mobile numbers, identity card numbers or scanning 
the QR code. BNM has identified PayNet as the operator of Malaysia’s shared payment 
infrastructure. This infrastructure will provide open and unbiased access to both banks and non-
bank e-money issuers. Having a common infrastructure would shift the focus of competition 
among market players away from infrastructure and towards value-added services (Muhammad, 
2017).  
4.2.2 Financial Technology Enabler Group (FTEG) 
The FTEG was started by BNM in 2016 to support FinTech innovations that increases quality, 
efficiency and access to financial services in Malaysia. They are responsible for formulating and 
enhancing regulatory policies to facilitate and accelerate, wherever applicable, the adoption of 
FinTech. The FTEG is responsible, together with BNM, for the launch of Malaysia’s FinTech 
regulatory sandbox, which will be expounded in the following section. 
4.2.3 Regulatory Sandbox 
The launch of the fintech regulatory sandbox is needed given the rise of fintech solutions and 
innovative business models. The implications of this has led to BNM seeking to provide a 
regulatory environment that is conducive for FinTech deployment – which includes the review and 
adaptation of regulations or procedures that are anti-innovation. Implied in this, the sandbox is 
used to catch regulatory and compliance policies that may inhibit innovation by looking at the 
operations of FinTech start-ups and their products/services (Reyes, 2017). A sandbox enables 
innovative FinTech to be deployed and tested in a live environment, given specified parameters 
and timeframe. However, with the sandbox operating in a live environment, risks persist and may 
cause financial loss to sandbox participants and or customers. Thus, BNM recognises the 
importance of incorporating safeguards in the sandbox model for risk management purposes in the 
event of failures. This will be further explained later. In addition, the sandbox cannot be used by 
participants seeking to get around existing laws and regulations. So, it is not suitable for any 
proposals that are already addressed under prevailing regulations – if the proposals fall into this, 
BNM will take an “Informal Steer” approach and provide guidance and advice on the 
modifications needed on the proposals to align it to prevailing laws. Hence, these form the 
principles on the necessity and importance of having a regulatory sandbox.  
The objective, then, for the regulatory sandbox is to encourage deployment of fintech in a 
regulatory environment, essentially finding the balance between regulation and innovation. BNM 
will factor in 3 main considerations for the extent of flexibilities to exercise on regulations for 
sandbox participants: 
1) Potential benefits of the proposed product/service/solution 
2) Potential risks and respective mitigating measures 
3) Integrity, capability and track record of FIs or fintech companies 
BNM outlined the eligibility criteria in a section. The approval to participate in the sandbox can 
be summarised into the points below: 
 The proposed product/service/solution is innovative with potential to improve the 
following factors: 
o Accessibility, efficiency, security and quality of financial services 
o Efficiency and effectiveness of risk management 
o Existing gaps or open new opportunities on financing and investments 
o Applicant has assessed that the product is useful and functional, and has identified 
the relevant risks 
o Applicant has sufficient resources to support the sandbox testing, which includes 
buffer and expertise to mitigate potential risks and losses during the test period 
o There must be a realistic business plan for deployment on a commercial scale upon 
exit from the sandbox 
o Proposed product/service/solution must not be governed under prevailing laws 
o Applicant must have a management team or board of directors with proven track 
record  
 
Figure 5 Process of applying and participating in the Regulatory Sandbox* 
*Note that for all rejected applications, there will be 6 months cooling off period before the 
applicant can resubmit the application 
In addition, advantages are afforded to fintech companies that collaborate with financial 
institutions, especially in guidance and resources offered by FIs. The advantages spelled out in the 
framework are in regulatory requirements and risk mitigations. Also, fintech companies with the 
potential to contribute to the creation of high value-added jobs will be more favourably assessed. 
In its next section, BNM has placed the onus on the applicant to identify the potential risks that its 
proposed solution may have towards the FIs and consumers during the testing period. After doing 
so, the applicant too must propose appropriate safeguards to address these risks. This action is in 
line with the second point of the eligibility criteria listed above. BNM will assess the risks and 
proposed safeguards according to the following points: 
Risk 
 Preserves sound financial and business practices that are consistent with financial stability 
 Treats consumers fairly 
 Prevents ML/TF 
 Ensures customers’ information are kept confidential 
Application
•Applicant will be 
assessed against the 
eligibility criteria and 
proposed safeguards
•Applicant will be 
informed of eligibility 
within 15 working days 
upon submission of 
application
Preparation
•Participants will work 
with BNM to come out 
with the details on 
testing parameters, 
measures to gauge 
success/failure, exit 
strategy and transiton 
plan. All these are 
done before the test 
begins
Testing
•Participant can start 
testing after BNM's 
approval
•Additional information 
may be needed over 
the course of the 
sandbox
•Participants are 
required to submit 
interim records during 
the test, and final 
report after the test
 Payment systems and instruments must be safe, reliable and efficient 
 Innovative Islamic financial services must be compliant to Shariah standards 
 Healthy competition among financial products and services 
Safeguards 
 Adequate disclosure of potential risks to consumers during the testing period, of which 
consumers must show understand and acceptance of risks 
 Limit the number of consumers and or the aggregate value or frequency of transactions 
during the testing period 
 Limit consumers’ participation to a certain segment or consumer’s profile 
 Limit duration of the testing period 
 Provide an avenue for consumer redress, including the option for financial compensation 
that is claimable under specified circumstances 
 Committing adequate and competent resources, both financial and expertise, to lead and 
manage the testing. This is needed for the implementation of risk mitigation solutions in 
the event of failure. 
However, we have some counter arguments over the role of BNM in the regulatory sandbox and 
the purpose of the sandbox. There are a couple of points raised in the above paragraphs that seem 
to be conflicting with one another. They are: 
1. One objective of the sandbox is to catch regulatory and compliance policies that may 
inhibit innovation by looking at the operations of FinTech start-ups and their 
products/services 
2. The proposed product/service/solution is genuinely innovative 
3. Advantages are afforded to fintech companies that collaborate with financial institutions, 
especially in guidance and resources offered by FIs 
4. BNM has placed the onus on the applicant to identify the potential risks that its proposed 
solution may have towards the FIs and consumers during the testing period 
However, this objective seems to confuse 1) the role of BNM and 2) the purpose of the sandbox. 
1) The role of BNM 
 
Basing this from the second, third and fourth point, it would be difficult to pinpoint BNM’s 
role during the sandbox testing period. In the second point, the wording used is genuinely 
innovative. This seems to suggest that BNM are in favour of a proposed solution being new 
in the market. Yet, the framework does not qualify what constitutes a solution as new. 
However, the greater point is limiting this at the sandbox stage would limit the element of 
innovation, which I feel is crucial in the financial ecosystem to ensure that entities are 
always improving themselves and seek to serve the larger economy. 
 
In the third point, affording advantages to fintech companies that collaborate with FIs 
seems to be conflicting with the spirit of innovation. Small fintech companies could have 
breakthrough technologies but lack the accessibility to funding or to institutions. Hence in 
applying for sandbox testing, they may be given up for a fintech company that has 
collaborated with an FI. However, BNM could act as a catalyst for this, linking up their 
network of FIs to such fintech companies should the proposed solution meet the eligibility 
criteria spelled out in the framework 
 
In the fourth point, would not the role of BNM be to identify the potential risks of the 
proposed solution and apply appropriate safeguards? The onus seems to fall squarely on 
the applicant. For BNM to effectively carry out its role as a regulator, it would be important 
to be in the process, with the applicant, to identify risks and the relevant mitigation 
measures. 
 
BNM should assess applicants based on the potential of the proposed solution and the level 
of innovation in the underlying technology. While this assessment would factor in risk, 
BNM role as a regulator would be to provide clear guidelines on the severity of different 
types of risks, and to provide guidance and oversight to manage such risks. In all, I feel 
that there is a need to clearly distinguish the dual roles of assessment and regulator – this 
could take on the form of creating different teams to assess and manage risk or to establish 
a different set of protocols in the application process. 
 
2) Purpose of the sandbox 
 
The sandbox seems to serve a Proof-Of-Concept (POC) model to BNM with the 
abovementioned objective. That should not be part of or the purpose of the sandbox – 
educating BNM on new, potentially proprietary financial technology. I have 3 arguments 
to support my view. 
 
First, sandbox is not the medium for education. The main aim for companies to utilise the 
sandbox is to test their solutions on a small group of consumers with the view on 
widespread adoption upon exit of the sandbox. Instead, if it is used for education, it would 
divert the focus of these companies away from their users and towards regulators. This 
could increase compliance burdens for the companies which may prove to be costly. 
 
Second, the erosion of advantage through observation. Before listing my argument, the 
framework stated that for products, services or solutions that are not suitable to be in the 
sandbox, BNM will take the approach of an “Informal Steer”. This is done to provide 
guidance and advice to FIs or fintech companies on the modifications they can do to align 
their business models or solutions with prevailing laws and regulations (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2016). This consultative approach is problematic. Competitive advantages for 
companies are usually established through its operations and or products/services offered. 
With BNM observing companies in the sandbox, the company’s technology and processes 
will be made available. These can turn out to be sensitive. Linking it back to “informal 
steer”, questions have to be asked on how sandbox participants’ business processes and 
technology can remain confidential as BNM provide guidance and advice to other FIs or 
fintech companies outside of the sandbox.  
 
Third, the strain on resources. Having the sandbox as a POC model would place a strain 
on resources for early entrants. While the regulators are being educated of new FinTech 
solutions and processes, concurrently they must be able to identify if the proposed solution 
shows the potential to effect positive, value-added impact to the larger economy. The 
hypothesis here is for the earlier entrants, this process of evaluating the potential proposed 
solution would be less efficient, causing it to be dragged on. For example, the regulator 
will take longer to decide that a fintech start-up’s product would not bring positive change 
to the economy and waste the start-up’s resources for an extended period. Comparing this 
to a similar product that reappears in the sandbox after 6 months, the regulator would be 
quicker to issue a “No”. In all of these, by having the sandbox operate as a POC, it may 
benefit the regulators, but it would not benefit start-ups or companies that have finite 
resources. 
 
4.3 Thailand FinTech Space 
4.3.1 Thailand 4.0 
In 2016, Thai’s military junta unveiled its policy named “Thailand 4.0”. It is an industrial policy 
that is sector-specific aiming to transform the economy. The transformation will be defined by 
innovative technology-based manufacturing and services (The Economist, 2017). 
 
Figure 6: Languepin, O. (2018, October 4). Thailand 4.0, What Do You Need To Know? 
Retrieved from Thailand Business News: https://www.thailand-business-
news.com/economics/54286-thailand-4-0-need-know.html 
 
From Figure 6, Thailand follows its predecessors in its naming and purpose – to show the next 
sector primed for development. The first stage was focused on agriculture, followed by light 
industry with low wages. Thailand is currently in transition between Thailand 3.0, which focuses 
on heavy industries with advanced machinery, and Thailand 4.0 which shifts to an economy that 
is digitally oriented and innovation driven, focusing on high-value-added manufacturing and 
services (The Economist, 2017). 
Thailand 4.0 lays out the fundamentals to FinTech development, highlighting Thailand’s potential 
to leapfrog early-stage digital banking services and move towards integrated digital commerce and 
other value-added FinTech services (Leesa-Nguansuk, 2017). And this is needed, with Thailand’s 
digital banking penetration standing at 19%, credit card usage of 3.7% (Leesa-Nguansuk, 2017), 
smartphone penetration at 30% and 68% of the Thai population using cash as their preferred mode 
of payment (United Overseas Bank, 2017). 
The junta has selected 10 strategic industries for development, of which FinTech initiatives do not 
just serve as an enabler but also forms one of these 10 industries, namely digital services. The first 
5 S-Curve are industries that are currently found in Thailand (e.g. Electrical and Electronics, 
Automotive, Tourism, Jewellery and Gems and Agriculture) where value can be added with new 
technologies. The 5 new S-Curve will focus on developing industries that are new to the country 
(The Economist, 2017). Those new industries include Robotics, Aviation & Logistis, Biofuels & 
Biochemical, Digital and Comprehensive Medical Industry. An explanation offered by Accenture 
about S-Curve fits with Thailand 4.0 policy.  
Its argument is that market growth will stop at some point in time, and it becomes a necessity to 
migrate to the next opportunity. This is known then as “jumping” to the next S-curve (Nunes & 
Breene, 2011). However, this is ambitious. Thailand lacks the domestic capabilities to develop 
these 10 industries, hence the success of the policy will be heavily dependent on Thailand’s ability 
to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). New legislations have come into force that seeks to 
provide incentives, which includes tax exemption, expanding shareholding options for foreigners, 
to name a few (The Economist, 2017). A recent report from United Nations show that FDI to 
Thailand rose by 3.7 times due to increased inflows from European Union (EU) and ASEAN. 
However, a look at FDI inflows data from 2012 (9135 millions) to 2017 (7635 millions) shows 
that Thailand has been struggling from below-par FDI figures. This negative trend is made starker 
when compared with FDI inflows for the entire region of South-East Asia and against ASEAN 
members. The Economist Intelligence Unit argues that the negative trend is caused by 1) scarcity 
of skilled labour and 2) weakening domestic market for goods and services. For point 1, UNESCO 
stated in its Global Education Monitoring Report in October 2017 that only 50% and 46% of 
students had a minimum proficiency in reading and mathematics respectively, upon completion of 
lower secondary education. These statistics have remained the same from 2003 to 2015, showing 
no improvements. For point 2, private consumption growth only averaged 2.8% per year from 
2012-2016. In comparison, Indonesia and Malaysia posed 5.2% and 6.9% respectively within the 
same period. A sluggish growth in private consumption shows fragile consumer confidence in 
Thailand’s economic prospect and one cause of this is the political uncertainty that still surrounds 
the country (The Economist, 2017). 
This analysis shows the challenges that Thailand needs to overcome to increase investors’ 
confidence in its economy, ultimately securing the success of Thailand 4.0. At the same time, this 
sets out the context for analysing some initiatives that are proposed and or implemented by 
Thailand, more specifically to encourage the development of FinTech. 
 
 4.3.2 Regulatory Sandbox 
 
Like the findings of Singapore and Malaysia, Thailand has its version of a regulatory sandbox, 
introduced by the Bank of Thailand (BOT) on 21 December 2016. BOT has identified FinTech to 
be a vital factor in developing the financial services industry and 1 of the 10 S-Curve sectors – 
Digital Economy in the Thailand 4.0 policy. To this end, BOT seeks to encourage the development 
of FinTech through (1) establishment of a Regulatory Sandbox and (2) support for FinTech Start-
ups by introducing financial institutions to Start-ups through a platform, increasing chances of 
partnership (Corbett, 2017). The sandbox specifies the qualifications for entry and participation 
into the sandbox and the rules that participants must follow once granted entry into the sandbox.  
BOT has outlined its goals of utilising a regulatory sandbox, which are: 
 To promote the innovation’s development which will increase choices for customers, 
improve access to financial services and decrease cost 
 To promote FinTech testing in a limited environment which would decrease time of 
implementation into live markets and increase scope of service into wider areas 
 To limit risk to the overall financial system 
 To promote learning and exchange of information between sandbox participant and BOT, 
leading to proper governance and preventing impediments to the innovation’s development 
BOT, comparatively with Singapore and Malaysia, has laid out an exclusive guideline on its target 
audience, which includes financial institutions, FinTech firms and general technology firm (Bank 
of Thailand, 2016). Moreover, applicants are expected to have measures proving good corporate 
governance, data protection and confidentiality, security of work processes and information, 
AML/CFT and proven track record in managing assets. BOT has also scoped the types of 
innovation that can be tested in its sandbox, namely lending, payment and transactions deemed 
appropriate by BOT – essentially a black box. Additionally, participating in the sandbox does not 
exempt the company from applying for other licenses necessary for its innovation to operate in 
Thailand. 
There are additional points of contention: 
 Financial products and services seeking to enter the Regulatory Sandbox must be a new 
innovation  
 Applicant must present research that shows the potential and risk of the innovation  
 Applicant must specify the test’s duration, scope and expected results 
 Applicant must have sufficient capital to carry out the test and implement the innovation 
upon exit from the sandbox 
 Applicant must have an exit strategy if the test is unsuccessful or an implementation plan 
if the test is successful  
Within the sandbox application, when an applicant has qualified to participate in the sandbox, it 
must conduct the following: 
 Provide consumers with accurate, timely information during the testing period 
 Consumers have complete control in selecting their choice of financial products/ services 
 Provide channels to consumers to receive feedback and manage complaints 
 Allow monetary claims to consumer should they suffer financial loss, not caused by them, 
during the testing period 
 Must have safeguards against AML/ CFT 
 Must adhere to related laws 
 Timely submission of test reports that shows statistical and risk information, key 
performance indicators, system errors and consumer complaints (if any) to BOT, during 
and after the testing period 
 
The need to comply to these qualifications before applying for the Regulatory Sandbox 
could become major obstacles to foreign companies and smaller FinTech Start-ups, which 
leads to questions over the effectiveness of the Sandbox. Regardless, it is a relatively new 
initiative by BOT, so it remains to be seen how successful it is in achieving its objectives. 
Moreover, applicants must prove that their innovation and or technology is new, which is 
defined by being different from existing products or financial services in Thailand. This is 
similar to a requirement in Malaysia’s Regulatory Sandbox and this could inhibit the 
element of innovation. An important consideration is whether improvements to existing 
products or financial services can be allowed to participate in the sandbox for it may fulfil 
BOT’s objective of decreasing cost of business, increase choices for consumers and 
promote the development of innovations. 
4.3.3 National e-Payment Master Plan 
 
In October 2016, BOT launched its National e-Payment Master plan that is aimed at 
promoting the use of e-Payment across all sectors. With this, BOT started with an 
electronic money transfer service called PromptPay (Chantanusornsiri & Banchongduang, 
2016). This project would see the development of an infrastructure that would help 3 wide 
sectors, namely public, private and the general public to achieve two aims, one to make it 
more convenient and cheaper to transfer funds and support e-Commerce growth (Bank of 
Thailand, 2016). In addition, BOT pushed forward a second project – Card Usage 
Expansion Project which seeks to expand Electronic Data Capture (EDC) distribution and 
promote the use of debit cards instead of cash. This aims to decrease costs associated with 
cash management and allow both businesses and the general public to experience the 
convenience of using card-based payments over cash. 
 
Using PromptPay allows transfers to be carried out conveniently. There is no longer a need 
to obtain the receiver’s bank account number, but instead transfers can be done with 
national ID card number, corporate tax ID number or mobile phone number. Moreover, the 
service fees associated with PromptPay is lower than traditional transfer services, as seen 
in table 2. With these rates, it would incentivize a switch to PromptPay and also to increase 
the value and volume of transactions. However, PromptPay brings bad news for 
commercial banks. The lower service fees will cut into banks’ revenue. For example, 
Kasikorn’s money transfer fees make up 2% of the bank’s total revenue, and PromptPay 
would see its money transfer fees being a tenth of what it previously was. For now, 
PromptPay is for users who are banked, but there are future plans to introduce an e-Wallet 
service to PromptPay and it remains to be seen if users who are unbanked would be able to 
use the service. 
 Considering the emerging trend of the population using mobile banking for fund transfers, 
increasing from 27.4% to 43.8% in the 2015-2016 period, the development of a common 
infrastructure found in PromptPay is welcomed by consumers, allowing the scaling of 
reach to remote/ rural parts of Thailand. Over the course of 2015-2016, Thailand has seen 
a 90.2% growth in the value and a 123.6% growth in volume, transferred using mobile 
banking.  
Using e-Payment is not without its risk. As such, BOT is focused on supervising service providers 
to ensure that there are appropriate security and alignment with robust standards to build 
confidence in using e-Payments. BOT established the Guiding Principles for Trusted Mobile 
Payments. It serves as a guideline to build and enhance good service standards so that users are 
confident and increase their usage of mobile payments. The guideline is made up of 6 key 
principles: 
1) Risk Management: Providers must have risk management processes that cover IT security, 
cyber and operational risk 
2) Secure Authentication: Providers must have process and methods to protect against identity 
theft 
3) Consumer protection and education: Protect users against risks or potential frauds, 
including unauthorized access to users’ confidential data. To education users to grow their 
awareness in payment transaction security 
4) Openness and Interoperability: Support fair competition and serve innovative choices for 
customers. Promote investments in IT infrastructure that supports efficient mobile 
payments 
5) AML/CFT and fraud protection: Providers must comply with relevant laws and processes 
such as customer identity verification and Know Your Customer/ Customer Due Diligence 
(KYC/CDD) 
6) User experience: Create satisfaction of user experience which will change users’ behaviour 
to use their mobile for payments. 
Another initiative is to increase collaboration between relevant regulators to share information and 
expertise, resulting in consistent regulatory frameworks. BOT acknowledged that technological 
advancement has led to a rapid development and unprecedented changes in the financial and 
payment services. These pose challenges to regulators as they are exposed to new types of risks 
and the changing nature of the scope of users. BOT has signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) with the office of The National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission 
(NBTC) to conduct a study in a narrow, but important scope on regulating payment services used 
via mobile and wireless devices. This strategic relationship is important. With PromptPay as an 
example, changing SIM card is no longer a straightforward exercise as PromptPay accounts are 
linked to mobile phone numbers. As such, NBTC has set new standards in authenticating users for 
new SIM card issuances, change in SIM card ownership and personal information change requests. 
The new standards require users to bring their national ID cards when carrying out these services 
which will enhance financial transaction service security and prevent against making transfers to 
incorrect mobile numbers or mobile numbers assumed by criminals for financial fraud. 
5. Recommendations 
 
The importance and necessity of mobile financial services in Myanmar is unquestionable. Yet, this 
industry is still in a nascent stage. As seen in the findings of this report, the role of governments in 
encouraging and developing economic sectors are crucial, and this is done through policies 
highlighting the governments’ priorities and strategies to achieve success. To this end, the 
Myanmar government presented an economic policy on July 2016 highlighted the government’s 
push to focus on 12 priorities (Kyaw & Hammond, 2016). In these 12, there are 6 of them that are 
relevant to this report, which are: 
1. Supporting competition and the private sector by practicing a market-oriented system in 
every sector, cut unnecessary red tape, dilute the power of monopolies and expand access 
to credit 
2. Infrastructure development which will have one of its focus areas on producing and 
distributing power 
3. Support agricultural sectors to encourage inclusive growth, boost food security, increase 
exports and enhance living standards. One of the ways to achieve this is to increase access 
to credit for farmers 
4. Welcoming FDI by promoting responsible business and creating a stable environment 
through improving property rights and enforce rule of law. In all, companies will be 
convinced that Myanmar is secure to invest in 
5. Creating a financial system that can provide capital to businesses, farmers and households 
in a sustainable manner. The government acknowledges that the financial sector is 
underdeveloped and excludes large sectors of the economy. The government will review 
limitations on bank lending and enable mobile banking among other initiatives 
6. Helping SMEs by improving the ease of doing business in Myanmar, increase access to 
financial services and develop a skilled workforce 
It is apparent that FinTech, especially mobile financial services, would become an important 
enabler for the government to achieve the goals set out in its economic policy. Hence, the following 
recommendations will be based off the points listed above and findings of neighbouring countries’ 
policies, strategies and best practices. However, as a disclaimer, these are my personal 
recommendations which are heavily derived by studying the examples of Singapore, Malaysia and 
Thailand. There are many political, societal and economic factors that are not privy to me, therefore 
the Myanmar government could or are already heading in a different direction pertaining to the 
area of MFS development. 
5.1 Adoption of Mobile Financial Services as a key focus area 
The countries analyzed in this report have specifically identified FinTech as an area to develop 
and support. In the same way, it would serve Myanmar well to do the same. However, I opine that 
the focus should be taken up by Central Bank Myanmar (CBM) and not the wider Myanmar 
government so that the adoption process can be sped up and not be subjected to long discussions 
in the house.  
In Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, taskforces have been created to spearhead growth and new 
initiatives in FinTech. This would allow expediency and lend focus in developing the industry. 
Likewise, it would be wise for Myanmar to do so, creating a taskforce that is housed in CBM and 
it is crucial for CBM to empower this taskforce to make decisions in mobile financial services. 
Myanmar’s financial system is subject to distrust by the population, with the banking crisis in 
2003, lengthy processes in opening accounts and carrying out basic banking transactions and the 
lack of basic banking infrastructure contributing to 1) 80% of people being outside of the formal 
financial system and 2) a greater need for mobile financial services (Minischetti & Gallery, 2018). 
To tackle this, consumer education and community engagement are crucial to increase the level of 
trust and convince users to utilize MFS. 
5.2 Modified payment infrastructure 
Following the examples of PromptPay, PayNow and PayNet in Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia 
respectively, it would be beneficial for Myanmar to have a shared payment infrastructure where 
the public and private sector can utilize. Not only that, but this will greatly increase access to 
financial resources to every part of Myanmar as long as the user has an Internet-enabled mobile 
phone.  
But instead of creating one, I believe using one of the existing players on the market would be 
more prudent as it does not require large capital outlay from the government and efficient in getting 
to market. This would be like the approach taken by Malaysia. They chose PayNet, an existing 
market player, to be the shared payment infrastructure in the country. 
This would also be an initiative of interest in part of addressing Myanmar’s issue with tax takes, 
and this would segue into the next recommendation of encouraging FDI inflows. 
5.3 Encourage FDI inflows 
Myanmar has one of the lowest tax takes in the world, amounting to just 6.4% of GDP. This 
highlights the lack of domestic capacity to push any tangible reform (The Economist, 2018). 
UNCTAD issued a World Investment Report in 2018 and categorized Myanmar as a structurally 
weak and vulnerable economy. Despite FDI inflows increasing by 45.2% year-on-year to 
US$4.3bn in 2017, this still represents a low absolute number. My view is that the usage of MFS, 
especially a shared payment infrastructure would increase the tax takes and address the difficulty 
of tax collection in a significant way. However, another issue that requires discussion is shoring 
investors’ confidence. 
It is important for the Myanmar government to cut unnecessary red tape and onerous requirements 
to encourage starting of new businesses. Following Thailand’s 4.0 policy, Myanmar could exercise 
flexibility and offer incentives for foreign corporations to invest into local companies that meets 
its economic reform policy. In its new Myanmar Companies Law (MCL), foreign investors can 
own up to 35% of a local company and still maintain its local company status. But 35% still 
represents a low equity percentage for investors. Also, Myanmar can follow in Thailand’s steps to 
offer special Visas for investors, executives and individuals who are involved in crucial industries, 
especially in FinTech to live in Myanmar. The caveat for this to work is that there must be cross-
ministry collaboration to share information and achieve the bigger picture. This special Visas 
would allow for skilled labour to not only come in and develop economically-significant 
industries, but also to share knowledge and develop the local workforce – all of importance to set 
the foundation for a more robust economy. To some extent, the Myanmar government has started 
granting visa-exemptions to some countries, with most coming from ASEAN. In my view, this is 
the low-hanging fruit which Myanmar should aim to provide visa-free status to all ASEAN 
member countries and extend it to other nationalities. 
5.4 Modified Regulatory sandbox 
FinTech is set to take the world by storm. Governments need to be prepared to synergise these 
disruptions with the prevailing financial systems and regulatory sandboxes are an excellent way to 
do so. Southeast Asian governments should be quick to design and operate sandboxes or risk losing 
out in the long term (Gnanasagaran, 2018). Across the 3 countries that were explored in this report, 
every regulatory sandbox has its nuances in qualifying conditions, operations and purpose.  
Myanmar should introduce a modified regulatory sandbox that would not only allow experiment 
on innovative FinTech products/ services/ solutions, but also to include networking which will 
allow non-bank companies and startups to partner up with banks to experiment and potentially 
launch in partnership. The latter objective is to ensure that upon a successful exit from the sandbox, 
the FinTech innovation will be collaborative and not disruptive which in my opinion would be an 
easier, low-hanging fruit to achieve and sustain over disruptive FinTech innovations. 
In the qualifying conditions, it should follow Singapore’s model, one that is as open as possible 
with the conditions to encourage more businesses, bank and non-bank to enter the sandbox. The 
reason for this is that volume would help the Myanmar government to experience the rapid 
progress of FinTech, learn and adjust current legislations to account for these innovations. 
However, some guidelines should still be present which includes AML/CFT prohibitions, proper 
risk management process and a robust data protection and confidentiality plan. 
In the operation of the sandbox, Myanmar should follow its counterparts in relaxing current laws 
and other red tape. The aim of it for the regulator is to see the potential and benefits of FinTech 
innovations on the economy, which would define the regulator’s role to be one that does not stifle 
but encourages creativity and innovation. 
With a successful exit from the sandbox, regulators should support the FinTech innovation’s 
deployment into the economy. Support can come in the form of expedited application for necessary 
licenses and or allowing partnerships with banks that have the existing licenses and adding on 
additional modules in these licenses. The modularity approach would increase efficiency by 
reducing redundant workload for both the government and company.  
 
6. Summary 
 
In summary, there are 4 main recommendations that the Myanmar government could consider 
implementing. They are: 
1) Adopting Mobile Financial Services as a focus area 
 Create a taskforce out of CBM to spearhead initiatives to develop the MFS industry 
 Tackle the citizenry’s general distrust in the country’s financial system through 
community engagements and user education 
 Allocation of resources to develop MFS as a focus area 
2) Introduce a shared payment infrastructure 
 Follows PayNow (Singapore), PromptPay (Thailand) and PayNet (Malaysia) 
 Addresses the current issue of fragmentation for payment/ fund transfer players in 
the market 
 Should not attempt to build a shared payment infrastructure from scratch – 
PromptPay model, but leverage an existing player in the market and establish an 
exclusive partnership – PayNet model 
 To be used by public and private sector, and it will increase access to financial 
resources for all 
 Can help to increase tax takes for the government 
3) Encourage FDI inflows 
 Myanmar lacks the domestic capacity due to low tax takes to develop the MFS 
industry 
 Need FDI to support sectoral development 
 The government needs to shore up investors’ confidence to make Myanmar an 
attractive proposition for investment.  
o Cut unnecessary red tape and increase the ease and efficiency of conducting 
business 
o Offering visa exemptions or special visas to investors, executives or 
individuals who are involved in crucial industries, which in this case, 
FinTech 
o Consider allowing higher equity ownership in local companies for foreign 
investors 
4) Introduce a Regulatory Sandbox 
 Allow experimentation in a test environment to assess the potential benefits and 
risk of the innovation. During the operation of the sandbox, regulators will 
determine the appropriate safeguards to manage risk but not stifle innovation and 
growth 
 Regulators are to be catalysts in matching innovative solutions to banks or MNCs 
to bring to market upon exit from the sandbox. This ensures that proposed solutions 
will be collaborative and not disruptive, benefitting users and the economy 
 Relax certain regulations during the operation of the sandbox 
 Regulators should support go to market opportunities by expediting license 
applications or even providing waivers. Also, regulators should encourage 
partnership with banks and exercise flexibility by allowing Startups or FinTech 
companies to be covered by the banks’ licenses 
Regulators should consider introducing a modular-based framework, which allows licenses to be 
granted and modified by adding on modules, as opposed to applying for a new license whenever a 
new product or service is introduced 
 
References 
Anuroj, B. (n.d.). Thailand 4.0 – a new value-based economy. Bangkok: Thailand Board of Investment. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.boi.go.th/newboi/upload/content/Thailand,%20Taking%20off%20to%20new%20h
eights%20@%20belgium_5ab4f8113a385.pdf 
Arnove, R. F., Kelly, G. P., & Altbach, P. G. (1982). Approaches and perspectives. New York: Collier 
Macmillan. 
Asian Development Bank; Oliver Wyman. (2017). Accelerating Financial Inclusion in South-East Asia with 
Digital Finance. Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
Bank Negara Malaysia. (2011). Financial Sector Blueprint 2011-2020: Strengthening our future. Kuala 
Lumpur: Bank Negara Malaysia. 
Bank Negara Malaysia. (2016). Financial Technology Regulatory Sandbox Framework. Kuala Lumpur: 
Bank Negara Malaysia. 
Bank of Thailand. (2016). Payment Systems Report 2016. Bangkok: Bank of Thailand. 
Bank of Thailand. (2016). Regulatory Sandbox. Thailand: Silk Legal. 
Bank of Thailand. (2018). Payment Systems : Standardized QR Code in Thailand. Bangkok: Bank of 
Thailand. 
Chantanusornsiri, W., & Banchongduang, S. (27 June, 2016). E-payment countdown. Bangkok Post. 
Collier, D. (1993). Political Science: The State of the Discipline II. Washington D.C.: American Political 
Science Association. 
Corbett, J. (2017). Thailand launches regulatory sandbox for fintech services. Asia Business Law Journal. 
Deloitte. (2013). Myanmar: The next Asian telecommunications greenfield? Deloitte Southeast Asia Ltd. 
Gnanasagaran, A. (22 February, 2018). Fintech sandboxes in Southeast Asia. Retrieved from The ASEAN 
Post: https://theaseanpost.com/article/fintech-sandboxes-southeast-asia 
GSMA. (2016). GSMA Mobile Connectivity Index. Retrieved from 
https://www.mobileconnectivityindex.com/#year=2016&zoneIsocode=MMR 
Htun, P., & Bock, P. (2017). Mobilizing Myanmar: A Smartphone Revolution Connects The Poor With 
Economic Opportunity. Seattle: Partners Asia. 
Kean, T. (2017). Myanmar's Telecommunications Law Threatens its Democratisation Process. Singapore: 
Yusof Ishak Institute. 
Kyaw, A. T., & Hammond, C. (26 July, 2016). Government reveals 12-point economic policy. Retrieved 
from Myanmar Times: https://www.mmtimes.com/business/21664-nld-12-point-economic-
policy-announcement.html 
Languepin, O. (4 October, 2018). Thailand 4.0, What Do You Need To Know? Retrieved from Thailand 
Business News: https://www.thailand-business-news.com/economics/54286-thailand-4-0-need-
know.html 
Lee, H. L. (17 August, 2014). Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's National Day Rally 2014 Speech (English). 
Retrieved from Prime Minister's Office Singapore: https://www.pmo.gov.sg/newsroom/prime-
minister-lee-hsien-loongs-national-day-rally-2014-speech-english 
Leesa-Nguansuk, S. (17 December, 2017). Thailand lags in fintech development in Asia. Retrieved from 
South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-
asia/article/2123302/thailand-lags-fintech-development-asia 
Lijphart, A. (1971). Comparative Politics and Comparative Methods. American Political Science Review 
65, 682-693. 
MAS. (2016). FinTech Regulatory Sandbox Guidelines. Singapore: Monetary Authority of Singapore. 
Minischetti, E., & Gallery, B. (23 February, 2018). Harnessing the power of fintech in Myanmar. Retrieved 
from Frontier Myanmar: https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/harnessing-the-power-of-fintech-in-
myanmar 
Muhammad, b. I. (8 December, 2017). Governor's Keynote Address at the Payment System Forum & 
Exhibition 2017. (B. N. Malaysia, Interviewer) 
Nam, K.-Y., Cham, M. R., & Halili, P. R. (2015). Developing Myanmar's Information and Communication 
Technology Sector toward Inclusive Growth. Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
Nunes, P., & Breene, T. (2011). Jumping the S-Curve. Boston: Harvard Business Review Press. 
Pennings, Paul, Keman, Hans, & Kleinnijenhuis. (1999). Doing research in political science. Thousand 
Oaks, California: Sage Publications. 
Prensky, M. (5 October, 2001). Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants. On the Horizon. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. (2017). Myanmar Business Guide. Yangon: PwC Myanmar. 
PwC. (2018). Strengthening Singapore’s payment services through regulation: MAS' proposed Payment 
Services Bill. Singapore: PwC. 
Ragin, C. C. (1987). The comparative method: moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Reyes, L. (22 June, 2017). The Malaysian fintech ecosystem is on the brink of a revolution, and everyone 
is in on it. Retrieved from e27: https://e27.co/malaysian-fintech-ecosystem-revolution-
20170622/ 
Sibunruang, M. (2018). Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC). Bangkok. 
Smart Nation and Digital Goverment Office; Monetary Authority of Singapore; The Association of Banks 
in Singapore. (23 September, 2017). Why should Singapore move towards e-payments. 
Retrieved from Singapore Government: https://www.gov.sg/factually/content/why-should-
singapore-move-towards-e-payments 
Tan, S. K., Neo, E., & Oeni, J. S. (2012). Myanmar: Opportunities in Asia's Last Frontier Economy. 
Singapore: International Enterprise Singapore. 
The Economist. (16 November, 2017). Thailand 4.0: in sight but not in reach. Retrieved from The 
Economist Intelligence Unit: 
http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1746126758&Country=Thailand&topic=Economy 
The Economist. (1 March, 2018). Myanmar’s government unveils a 238-point economic reform plan. 
Retrieved from The Economist: https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/03/01/myanmars-
government-unveils-a-238-point-economic-reform-plan 
UNCTAD, U. N. (2018). World Investment Report 2018 - Investment and New Industrial Policies . Geneva: 
United Nations Publication. 
United Overseas Bank. (2017). State of FinTech in ASEAN. Singapore: United Overseas Bank. 
Vasagar, J., & Weinland, D. (6 May, 2016). Singapore banks become a hotbed for 'fintech'. Retrieved 
from Financial Times: https://www.ft.com/content/7dc5fcb0-1120-11e6-91da-096d89bd2173 
 
 
 
 
